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BOOK REVIEW: BOGEN ON SOCIAL THEORY, 
RULES, AND ORDER 
James J. Chriss, Cleveland State University 
Social science at the beginning of the new millennium is nothing if not 
constantly expanding its substantive foci, in effect problematizing certain 
fundamental areas of reality and suggesting that these areas represent central 
or core objects of study. The idea of "central concept" has become so 
widespread now that the traditional way of parsing up areas of study by 
discipline (economics, sociology, psychology, anthropology, political science, 
history, etc.) has fallen into disrepair. 
Some of these central concepts are gender, race, culture, the self, control, 
power, systems, personality, social space or distance, birth, death, chemicals 
or hormones, communication, and with regard to the latter more specifically, 
talk. It is this last concept, talk, thatlakes center stage in David Bogen's Order 
Without Rules: Critical Theory and the Logic ofConversation. 
Bogen's book is somewhat deceiving, for although small in size (188 pages) 
its analytical ambitions are huge. Bogen is dealing simultaneously with speech 
act theory; ethnomethodology; the problems offoundationalism, meaning, and 
order; conversation analysis; Wittgenstein; Habermas, and critical theory. 
Before I even getlo an explanation ofwhat it is he is up to, I first wantlo state 
that, although there are some rough spots, Bogen has done a good job oftaking 
a group of disparate and even antagonistic theoretical and methodological 
programs and weaving them into a coherent problematic. 
Bogen's Problematic 
I refer to Bogen's narrative as a "problematic" insofar as various key players 
or ideas are introduced to bring into relief other thinkers who, although 
working in the same substantive area - talk or communicative interaction-
hold vastly different conceptions of how best to make sense of this elusive 
*1 thank Philip Malllling for commenting on an earlier version of this paper. 
concept. Bogen chooses to analyze the battle over talk that a number of 
disparate analysts and practitioners have waged as paradigmatic of an even 
more fundamental disagreement over (social) scientific visions and practices 
of logic, rules, and order. The starting point is Winch's (1958) commentary 
on Weber's notion that the natural sciences are fundamentally different than 
the social sciences insofar as the former are concerned with causal explanations 
of relationships between physical phenomena while the latter are concerned 
with the reasons - that is, the motives and intentions -lying behind why 
individual or collective actors engage in certain forms of social behavior. This 
is the Verstehen tradition in German sociology, associated strongly with 
Weber's dictum that in order to explain social phenomena sociologists ought 
to work at the level of meaning ofthe actors involved in order to understand 
the reasons the actors acted the way they did. Since science is concerned with 
developing general knowledge, Weber's problematic was closing the gap 
between what objectively is observed and why subjectively it was done. In 
other words, Weber's focus was on developing a methodology by which the 
subjective states ofa multitude ofactors could be discerned in some systematic, 
"rational" way. 
Winch goes on to point out Weber's error: the meaning of social action is 
not dependent on the "inner" mental life of individual actors. Here Winch is 
heavily influenced by a reading (problematic in its own right) ofWittgenstein's 
notion of "language game." The way we understand our own actions is the 
same way we understand others' actions, insofar as there exists a number of 
publicly organized and ratified social conventions - "talk" being one of the 
most important - by which shared forms of life are created and sustained. 
Since, according to Winch, Wittgenstein has shown how language is organized 
by social convention - and so in this non transcendental, normative sense is 
rule-governed - the meaning of our actions can be traced back to language 
itself as an externally visible and available resource. With language and the 
practical contexts within which it occurs being seen as the proper basis of 
meaning and rationality, one need not invoke the hoary notion of "mind" or 
"subjective states" when dealing with social phenomena. Most importantly, 
as Bogen notes, Winch (1990, p. 52) argues that "all behavior which is 
meaningful (therefore all specifically human behavior) is ipso facto rule 
governed." 1 
Rules, Rules, Rules 
In rejecting Weber's Verstehende sociology, Winch is attempting to follow 
Wittgenstein's (1958) notion oflanguage games, as previously noted. One of 
the standard implications of this position is that, since language has a set of 
rules (of syntax, phonetics, prosody, etc.) by which competent speakers are 
able to communicate, so too must there be a set of rules available to actors by 
which everyday life is made meaningful and intelligible. This "rules argument" 
approach is not only Winch's, bulis shared by a number ofscholarly traditions 
ranging from Austinian speech act theory to structuralism to Chomskian 
grammar. 2 These various proponents of the "linguistic turn" suggest that 
"social practices could be analyzed like games, where a game is constituted 
by a set of socially agreed conventions, and intelligible play consists in 
applying those rules in any particular case" (Bogen, 1999, p. 9). 
Bogen notes, however, that one of the glaring problems of this rules 
argument approach is that the notion of "rule" is accepted as a relatively 
unproblematic concept that is viewed (by these theorists) as actually guiding 
the behavior of real flesh-and-blood human beings in their everyday lives. 
Utilizing "rules" in this way simply elides the problem of interpretation 
Wittgenstein (1958) opened up with his famous paradox of20 1, the implication 
of which is the indeterminacy of rules (Bogen, 1999, p. 132). Wittgenstein's 
paradox begs the question: What is the ultimate basis ofnormative assertion? 
(Bramdon, 1994; Turner, 1998). 
Further, speaking of a language game as a set of rules that competent 
speakers follow implies that each set of social practices and traditions 
associated with the various language games (or societies) are more or less self-
contained and isolated from one another. As Overing (1985, p. 1) notes, 
Winch's interpretation ofWittgenstein suggests that 
our sense of reality is a social construction based on the conventional 
discourse of our society, the corollary ofwhich is that unrelated language 
communities may well have incommensurableworldviews and rationalities. 
The complication here is that, ifWinch is correct, there are no universal laws 
available by which to explain the varying norms, folkways, and ways of life 
that characterize various cultures. There are only discrete "language games" 
that make sense only within the context of each discrete culture or social 
system. 
This fragmentation - which has shown up most forcefully in the social 
sciences in Lyotard's (1984) postmodernist "loss of certitude" and rejection 
ofthe "grand metanarratives" ofEnlightenment philosophy -runs counter to 
the Enlightenment ethos ofdeductive-nomothetic explanation which seeks to 
uncover the laws ofthe social universe. This is also where Jurgen Habermas's 
(1984, 1987) program of formal pragmatics and theory of communicative 
action steps into the fray. Other researchers and research traditions seem 
content to work in specific, narrowly circumscribed areas ofempirical inquiry 
- such as the many programs oriented to the study of actual talk in concrete 
social settings, most notably ethnomethodology, discourse or conversation 
analysis (CA), and even some versions of speech act theory (see Geis, 1995). 
Habermas, however, is attempting to go beyond the empirical analysis oftalk 
or the categorization of types of speech via his Enlightenment program of 
general knowledge which seeks first and foremost to uncover the universal 
features oflogic, order, and reason underlying all forms oftalk.3 
Order Without Rules? 
Habermas cannot accept postmodernism's notion ofthe futility ofthe search 
for the foundations ofknowledge, logic, and reason, for without this foundation 
there would be no basis upon which to build a critical theory which aims at 
ameliorating or eliminating objectively oppressive social arrangements. Bogen 
favors, in spirit at least, Habermas's attempt at grounding critical theory in 
the normative foundations of everyday speech. But Bogen also believes the 
critical, ameliorative promise ofHaber mas's theory ofcommunicative action 
will never be fully realized unless or until Habermas incorporates into his 
theory important insights from the various practice-based or empirical studies 
of talk and understanding, whether Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, Goffman' s 
dramaturgy, CA's program of talk-in-interaction, or even speech act theory.4 
This brings us to the crux of Bogen's problematic, which as I suggested 
earlier is basically another take on the question, What is the ultimate basis of 
normative assertion? If indeed we cannot recover universal standards for the 
validity ofeveryday speech -which seems to be implied in Winch's and others' 
reading ofthe later Wittgenstein - there would seem to be no reasonable basis 
upon which to assess the intelligibility and cogency of statements. This, as 
we have seen, opens up social theory to the postmodernist loss of certitude 
about the Enlightenment quest for causal explanation and general theory. 
Indeed, ifmeaning is "endlessly deferred," how can there exist formally valid 
rules of discursive engagement; indeed, how is social order even possible? 
On the matter of reason, logic, and social order, Bogen argues for a middle 
ground between the analytical and empirical realms or approaches. Habermas's 
noble attempt to rescue the Enlightenment program by grounding reason in 
the universal validity claims inherent in all speech has not proven effective as 
a practical guideline for solving the problem of distorted (or coerced) 
communication in modern society (see Chriss, 1995). However, the failure 
of Habermas' s analytical program oftalk and communication does not mean 
we shouldjoin the postmodernists in proclaiming the "death of the subject" 
or accepting the futility of general understandings of discursive and social 
orders. This is because a few ofthe practice-based (empirical) programs have 
successfully illustrated that there are 
relatively stable, conventional methods by which utterances and actions 
are understood, arguments are assessed, facts are constituted, and disputes 
are resolved, and that the practical methods for reasoning and acting provide 
adequate grounds for persons' conduct irrespective ofappeals to universal 
standards of validity or rules of conduct. (Bogen, 1999, p. 2) 
Bogen dedicates chapter 4 to an analysis ofthe "talk-in-interaction" program 
of Emanuel Schegloff, the well-known and influential sociologist and 
conversation analyst. Whereas some complain that general theorists (such as 
Parsons and Habermas) operate at such high levels of abstraction that they 
oftentimes are unable to inform empirical research or practical application, 
others complain that the practice-based programs of talk (specifically, CAl 
are too narrowly focused on the minutia of talk and communication and hence 
often fail to connect their empirical insights to important "macro" phenomena 
of abiding interest to sociologists such as social class, stratification, power, 
and social structure more generally (see Hutchby, 1999). In contrast to 
Habermas's formal (or universal) pragmatics, CA is concerned with explicating 
how "lived" speech is organized. The program ofcapturing the minute details 
of strips of talk has led to fairly well established conventions for presenting 
and representing conversation between real human beings as it actually occurs 
in concrete social settings. !t is argued by Schegloff and others in CA that by 
faithfully recording and representing talk-in-interaction, the fundamental 
aspects ofthis particular human activity can be uncovered or discovered. No 
apriori sense of"rules" or "rule-drivenness" is imposed on the analysis, and 
hence CA stays closer to an inductivist strategy rather than taking the 
deductive-nomothetic approach of most traditional causal analyses. 
Although Bogen agrees that CA has indeed made progress in explicating 
certain obdurate features of everyday talk and sense-making (see Heritage, 
1999 for a summary ofthese accomplishments), he maintains that Schegloff 
and others in CA overstate the extent to which they have avoided imposing 
their own apriori sense oforderliness or rules on their data. Indeed, Schegloff s 
"discourse of the mundane" strategy, namely, the concentration on and the 
reporting of the routine, mundane features of everyday talk, becomes itself 
an analytical device for making sense of the multitude of instances of actual 
talk to which conversation analysts turn their attention. I would go even further 
than Bogen and claim that, in an important sense, the transcription devices 
for recording talk that CA researchers have developed actually "produce," as 
well as simply "report on," the orderliness discernible in talk. Bogen (1999, 
p. 91) is correct in pointing out that these transcription conventions function 
as a rhetorical device for setting a realist mood, much in the same fashion as 
the rhetorical device ofthe ancient epic narrative. !tis similar to the positivists' 
"sober" search for the "facts." Like the technical intelligentsia of the New 
Class, CAhas "painted God gray" in its prosaic, matter-of-fact attitude toward 
its subject matter (Gouldner, 1976, p. 262). 
Conclusion 
Even with the limitations outlined above (these paralleling the limitations of 
any program of "recovery," as Gouldner argued; see note 3), the empirical-
based programs have nonetheless illustrated the ways in which orderly courses 
ofsocial interaction are produced and recognized in situ by social actors. These 
local, practical accomplishments oftalk and social order-which are in effect 
ethnomethodology's objects of inquiry - provide to the analyst or theorist 
explanations of logic, order, and reason that need not be grounded in a more 
general, abstract, or universal sense of"rules." This is Bogen's "order without 
rules" thesis, detailed at length in chapter 5. 
Bogen returns to Wittgenstein for closure ofhis complex and multi-faceted 
argument. The confusion over rules that has plagued social theory for ages, 
but most acutely since Wittgenstein, has to do with the assumption that if 
certain objective practices are discernible to the researcher, this must mean 
ipso facto that the social actors engaged in any observable practice have some 
sense or understanding ofthe "rules" which makes these practices intelligible 
and accomplishable in the first place. But Bogen asks us to think ofthe chess 
player who knows all the rules of the game, who knows how to move the 
pieces, but who is not very "good" in the sense that he or she loses much of 
the time. As Bogen (1999, p. 139) suggests, "playing the game badly may have 
nothing to do with needing to learn some further rules, but instead may be 
explained by a lack of experience, practice, or aptitude." 
The murkiness of any "rules argument" approach, then, is simply this: in 
seeking to explain the reproducibility and intelligibility of social practices, 
most theorists are looking not simply for the conditions necessary and 
sufficient for playing the game poorly, but for those features of practice that 
are related to its mastery - of being able to do something well or seemingly 
effortlessly, observed as a relatively unproblematic accomplishment of, in, and 
for the moment. Presumably, if something is being done "poorly" there would 
be so much variance associated with the actual practice that no distinguishing 
set ofpatterned activities could be made out by the researcher to even warrant 
turning attention to the thing as an interesting or important activity in the 
first place. Indeed, how could the researcher even make the assessment that 
some practice was being enacted "poorly" without some prior knowledge 
of a set of competent practices that mark the activity as being of a certain 
type or kind? 
As Bogen (and Gouldner) show, even practice-based inquiries often employ, 
at some primitive level, a conception ofwhat "competent" practice means and 
what it entails, that is, what it looks like. This is why "the classical conception 
of 'rules' is ill-suited to the demands of explicating the endogenous logic(s) 
ofpractical social life" (Bogen, 1999, p. 140). Butthis is, in the end, what we 
are stuck with: it generally is easier to go from a priori conceptions of 
"competenf' practice (and the rules assumed to be entailed therein) to the 
empirical social world, rather than from the messy, empirical social world-
with its slapdash of competent and incompetent actors and their attending 
social practices- to the discovery of some set of rules underlying, energizing, 
and informing these practices. In the end, Bogen has perhaps unwittingly 
illustrated once again the "conservative" nature ofthe problem of social order, 
in that it favors "masterful" or "competent" performance in some area of 
social life rather than seeking out or explaining "incompetent" or "poor" 
performance. The latter is the hallmark ofthe dispossessed and downtrodden; 
in SUfi, of those persons or groups who in some sense are seen as "failures" 
in the grand scheme of things. 
James J. Chriss 
Department of Sociology 
Cleveland State University 
Cleveland, OR 44115, USA 
E-mail: j .chriss@csuohio.edu 
Notes 
1. 	 As 0 'Neill (1995, p. 132) notes, by claiming that to llllderstand language and society is 
virtually the same thing, Winch's position is close to that of the "double hermeneutic" 
(see Giddens, 1976). 
2. 	 For example, Alvin Gouldner' S (1974, 1979) notions ofthe "culture ofcritical discourse" 
and the "generative grammar" of socialism were heavily influenced by the rules argmnent 
explicit in structuralism and Chomskian grammar. Speakers who follow the rules of 
their speech community are considered to be competent speakers, in that they choose or 
are able to conform to these rules. A generative grammar acts as a kind of simulation 
program in that following the rules as prescribed allows one, within the context of a 
commllllity of speakers sharing the same grammar, to complete or produce what one 
wishes. The generative grammar is a deep (Gouldner preferred the tenn "latent") structure 
that de-randomizes hmnan conduct (Chriss, 1999). Presmnably, then, all empirical 
instances of social phenomena can be traced back to some relatively small set ofgenerative 
grammars (sets ofmles) that make these phenomena (whether talk, socialism, a chess 
game, etc.) meaningful and intelligible. 
3. 	 This distinction between Habermas' s inclination toward general theory and the empirically 
based programs of actual talk is the same distinction Gouldner (1985) made between the 
doctrines of holism and recovery, respectively. That is, on the one hand there are 
researchers working away feverishly in one small corner of the social world to the 
exclusion of being able, or even wanting, to grasp the whole (recovery). On the other 
hand there are researchers creating grand, epic visions of the social whole which, in 
effect, leads to a sort of social paralysis insofar as there are no ready guidelines for 
establishing which substantive topics are worthy of further empirical analysis (holism) 
(Chriss, 1999, p. 175). 
4. 	 Bogen rightfully notes that, for the most part, proponents of CA are critical of speech act 
theory. CA views speech act theory as providing only a limited or partial view of talk 
and meaning insofar as it tends to focus on the analysis of individual sentences and 
utterances in isolation from the social contexts within which they occur. By contrast, CA 
emphasizes the systematic organization of sequences of talk - tum-taking being seen as 
"fOlmdational" in this sense - in their concrete interactional settings (Goodwin, 1996; 
Psathas, 1990). Levinson (1992) attempts to mediate this dispute somewhat by arguing 
that Wittgenstein's paradox leads to two distinctive yet intercOllllected features of talk 
and interaction, namely speech acts and speech activities. CA is concerned of course 
primarily with the latter. 
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